

Fault Injection Characterization on modern CPUs From the ISA to the Micro-Architecture Thomas TROUCHKINE¹, Guillaume BOUFFARD^{1,2}, Jessy CLÉDIÈRE³ ¹ National Cybersecurity Agency of France (ANSSI) ² Information Security Group, École Normale Supérieure ³ CEA, LETI, MINATEC

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Digital systems usage





Secure elements✓ Certified

Mobile devicesX Not fully certified

Both are powered by System On Chips (SoCs)

Secure element (Evaluated)




simple CPU

Mobile device (Non-evaluated)



complex CPU

Secure element (Evaluated)



Mobile device (Non-evaluated)



complex CPU



multiple modules

Secure element (Evaluated)



simple CPU



few modules



internal memory only

Mobile device (Non-evaluated)




complex CPU




multiple modules



internal and external memory





Focus on the CPU behavior against Fault Injections

Fault characterization overview


On simple CPUs

- Pipeline (Balasch, Gierlichs, and Verbauwhede 2011)
- Buses (Moro et al. 2013)
- **Cache** (Rivière et al. 2015)
- Memory (Kumar et al. 2018)

On complex CPUs

Registers/Instructions (Proy et al. 2019)

Complex CPU model (functional view)



Analysis framework

Adversary model


- Developer access
- No hardware debug tools (JTAG, etc)

Analysis framework


Adversary model

- Developer access
- No hardware debug tools (JTAG, etc)

How to characterize the fault model ?




Analysis paths




Applied on BCM2837 and <u>Intel Core I3</u> against electromagnetic perturbations.

Analysis paths



Applied on BCM2837 and <u>Intel Core I3</u> against electromagnetic perturbations.

Analysis paths




Applied on BCM2837 and <u>Intel Core I3</u> against electromagnetic perturbations.

The bench

- High voltage (800V/16A) pulse generator
- Home-made electromagnetic probe (copper wire and ferrite)
- Arduino-based defibrillator
- GPIO based external trigger
- Fan based cooling system
- Test programs run over Debian 9





Fetch

Bus

Cache

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Execute

Decode


Initial values

- No simple arithmetic relations between them
- Set with all bit flipped also used

Register	Initial value	Register	Initial value
rax	0×80000000000000000001	r9	0×010000000000080
rbx	0×4000000000000002	r10	0×008000000000100
rcx	0×2000000000000004	r11	0×004000000000200
rdx	0×1000000000000008	r12	0×002000000000400
rsi	0×0800000000000010	r13	0×001000000000800
rdi	0×0400000000000020	r14	0×000800000001000
r8	0×0200000000000040	r15	0×000400000002000

Distribution of the faulted values (mov rbx, rbx)


The only faulted register is always **rbx**.



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Distribution of the faulted values (orr rbx, rbx)

The only faulted register is always **rbx**.



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Fault on registers ?

- Hypothesis with a first experiment \rightarrow bits reset
- Confirmation with a second experiment (new initial values)

13 to 30% of the cases:

0x2 = 0x40000000000002 and 0x2

8.7 to 16.7% of the cases:

0x0 = 0x40000000000002 and 0x0



Fault on instructions ?

instruction = *opcode* + *destination* + *operands*

In 36.6 to 56.5% of the cases: second operand faulted

mov rbx, rbxorr rbx, rbx \rightarrow mov rbx, rax (38.46%) \rightarrow orr rbx, rax (77.78%) \rightarrow mov rbx, rcx (15.38%) \rightarrow orr rbx, rcx (22.22%) \rightarrow mov rbx, rdi (46.15%)

Instruction corruption fault model



Fault in the pipeline or in the memory ?

Usual memory fault models:


- X Instruction skip
- X Instruction replacement
- X Instruction repetition
- ✓ Instruction corruption


Where does the fault appear ?

(fetch, decode, execute, cache, bus)


Usual pipeline fault models:

✓ Instruction corruption






Is fault after decoding ? \rightarrow fault instructions with different encoding



Is the fault in the dedicated part of the memory ? \rightarrow fault data memory access



Is the fault in the mixed part of the memory ? \rightarrow fault data memory access

Results of the characterization

- Fault identified in the registers and the dedicated to instructions memory subsystem (fetch or instruction cache)
- Instruction fault targets the second operand
- Data fault is a bit reset



On the method

- $\checkmark\,$ Able to identify faulted micro-architectural blocks using ISA
- ✓ No hardware access or tools needed
- X Non exhaustive
 - Some faulted values are not identified
 - Some optimizations (shadow registers, *etc*) are not considered



About the characterization method

- Improve the model by adding micro-architectural blocks (pre-fetch, line buffers, etc)
- Confirm the relevance of these blocks in the fault characterization
- Enlarge the scope of the used values for the fault characterization

About the fault model usage

- Integrate the fault model characterization into an attack evaluation process
- Focus on the perturbation of other modules than the CPU



References

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Josep Balasch, Benedikt Gierlichs, and Ingrid Verbauwhede. "An In-depth and Black-box Characterization of the Effects of Clock Glitches on 8-bit MCUs". In: *Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography, FDTC 2011, Tokyo, Japan, September 29, 2011.* Ed. by Luca Breveglieri et al. IEEE Computer Society, 2011, pp. 105–114. ISBN: 978-1-4577-1463-4. [Kum+18]

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